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This paper presents an up-to-date survey of the comparison issue be-
tween state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and township-village enterprises 
(TVEs) in China. Although TVEs are at a disadvantage in areas such as 
technology, labor skills, education levels of staff. access to bank loans and 
government supports, they have important advantages in ownership and 
governance structures, personnel systems and labor relations, and condi-
tions of institutional arrangement. These advantages apparently have out-
weighed the disadvantages, allowing the TVEs to outperform SO Es and suc-
cessfully expand their market shares that previously belonged to the SOEs. 
However, our analysis also reveals that SOEs may not have performed so 
badly if their broad social contributions other than reported profits are also 
taken into account. Jn conclusion, we argue that both SOEs and TVEs need 
to reform their ownership and governance structures. Jn particular, if TVEs 
are to develop further during the next century, they cannot avoid the 
grassroots democratization. 
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1. Introduction 
While China's overall economic reform has resulted in considerable 
achievements in the past two decades, some deep structural problems remain, 
one of which is the long-lasting inefficiency of the state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs). Although there have been disputes over the total factor productivity 
of SO Es, it is widely acknowledged that a growing proportion of SO Es are 
losing money. According to a recent World Bank ( 1997) report, about half of 
industrial SO Es made a loss in 1996, up from one-third just two years ago. The 
SOE share in national total industrial output has fallen from 77 .6 percent in 1980 
to 28.5 percent in 1996 (SSB, 1997, p. 413), and estimated to decline further to 25 
percent by the year 2000. 
The statistics seem to indicate that despite persistent enterprise re-
forms, the situation of SO Es is worsening, or at least has had little improve-
ment. Is this completely true? Or how bad is the performance of SO Es and 
why? This paper will show that official statistics do not provide a complete 
picture of the performance of SO Es. Moreover, where they underperform non-
SOEs, their underperformance relative to commercial measures can be partly 
explained by their attention to certain social objectives. 
In contrast, township and village enterprises (TYEs), which are either 
collectively established by or initially based on and closely associated with 
rural communities such as townships and villages, have developed rapidly and 
become engines of China's rapid economic growth. 1 In 1995, the TYE sector 
produced nearly 30 percent of China's gross domestic product (GDP). In the 
same year, industrial TYEs produced about half of the total industrial value 
added, profit, and output.2 In 1980, there were 1.4 million TYEs with 30 million 
employees. By 1996, there were 23.4 million TYEs with 135 million workers 
(SSB, 1997, pp. 399-400). Their real total output increased by an average rate of 
21 percent per annum from 1978 to 1995 (SSB, 1996, pp. 389 and 403), and the 
growth rate of their real value added remained over 18 percent in 1996 and 1997 
(People's Daily, 28 February 1998). The TYE exports increased from US$8 
billion in 1988 to US$84.3 billion in 1997. The TYE shares in the national total 
export rose from 16.9 percent in 1988 to 46.2 percent in 1997 (see, Table 2). 
The TYE miracle brings about a series of interesting questions. Typi-
cally, the core TYEs are collectively owned by the citizens in rural communities 
such as townships and villages. In this sense, TYEs are also public enterprises 
like SO Es. In addition, TYEs are usually competitively disadvantaged in com-
parison with SOEs in such areas as technology, labor quality and skills, ac-
cesses to bank credit, information flows within the government hierarchy, dis-
tribution of key materials through official channels, and other proxies for mar-
ket intermediaries. i-Iow can TYEs do so much better than SO Es? What are the 
real causes for the difference? Is there anything SO Es can learn from TYEs? 
Although some of the TYE experiences may be useful for the reform of small 
and medium SO Es, a careful examination of the management conditions has led 
us to conclude that TYEs actually have disadvantages in some crucial aspects 
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as well. In other words, the ownership and governance structures of both 
TVEs and SO Es need to be reformed. Such reforms have already been taking 
place since the mid- l 990s (Sun, 1999), and we expect to see more innovative 
structural changes in both sectors. 
This paper attempts to present a comprehensive survey of the SOE-
TVE comparative literature, incorporating our first-hand data and some origi-
nal analyses. We shall argue that the SOE performance may not have been as 
bad as statistics indicate, despite the fact that they have, in general, 
underperformed. Our viewpoint is based upon both external and internal per-
spectives, where the external factors refer to those beyond, and the internal 
factors those closely associated with, the notions of property rights, gover-
nance structure, and labor relations. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we summarize the 
external causes for SOE underperformance, which include their heavy social 
burdens, unfavorable position in taxation and pricing, and rapid de-capitaliza-
tion in recent years. The failure of China's state investment system and defec-
tive statistics have indeed contributed to the SOEs' underperformance. Sec-
tion 3 explains why TVEs have been so successful, with focus on the factors 
extrinsic to ownership. In sections 4 and 5, we focus on the internal factors that 
lead to the different performances of SO Es and TV Es. Section 4 highlights the 
differences of the governance structure between SO Es and TVEs. Section 5 
examines the personnel systems and labor relations in TVEs and SO Es, com-
paring the incentive and supervision mechanism of managerial and labor be-
havior. The last section contains some concluding remarks. 
2. External Causes for SOEs' Underperformance 
Undoubtedly, the development pace of the SOE sector has lagged 
behind that of the non-state sector. However, as we shall show, the SOEs' 
performance may actually not be as bad as statistics or the coverage by the 
Western media have indicated. While arguing that SOE underperformance may 
be partly justified by their considerable contribution to the overall social secu-
rity, we have no intention of joining the debate over the measurement of effi-
ciency or productivity of SO Es. We agree that SOE performance has not been, 
at least, as good as that of TVEs during the reform period. Many external 
factors have contributed to the reported poor performance of SO Es, among 
which we identify four of them that we consider most important. 
2.1. Social Responsibilities beyond Profit-Seeking 
The heavy social burden may be one of the predominant factors 
undermining the economic efficiency of SO Es. An SOE has never been a pure 
economic actor. It has historically had many other functions beyond profit-
seeking. These include political support to the government, expansion of em-
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ployment, and provision of various social services and securities, such as 
housing, education, health insurance, and pensions. What distinguishes the 
Chinese SO Es from their counterparts in Eastern Europe is that in China each 
SOE, particularly large and medium sized, fonns a resident community or small 
society in which all kinds of social services and facilities are provided by the 
enterprise. The manager of the SOE is more like a mayor or tribal chief. Tradi-
tional Chinese family values and employment pressure may have strengthened 
such welfare obligations, making them difficult to change. The increasing bur-
den for providing a large set of public goods to its community members has 
severely hindered the development of SO Es. 
Taking pension provision as an example, as the urban population 
ages, SOE pension payments have been mounting rapidly in terms of both 
absolute amount and relative share in the total wage payment. In 1980, the SOE 
sector had about 6.3 million retired employees and the ratio of the retired over 
the in-post was 1/13 . By 1996, the retired in the SOE sector had reached 25.2 
million and the ratio of the retired over the in-post rose to 1/6. Accordingly, the 
proportion of pension expenditure in the total wage payment increased from 
6.9 percent in 1980 to 22.6 percent in 1996 (SSB, 1997, pp. 121, 749-750). While 
the newly established SO Es have been relatively free of the pension burden, 
older SOEs have become weighed down by the increasingly heavy pension 
provision. 
To what extent is the SO Es' efficiency directly affected by their provi-
sion of the large set of public goods to the urban population? It has been 
estimated that about 40 percent of the difference in profitability between SO Es 
and TVEs can be attributed to social welfare provision of this kind (Xiao, 1991). 
In addition to the direct contribution, while functioning as a small society, an 
SOE has de facto provided unemployment insurance payment to its redundant 
employees (on-the-job unemployment). It is estimated that about 20 percent of 
employees in the SOE sector are in fact redundant (Bell, 1993). 
The above facts indicate that these heavy social burdens may justify 
a large part of SOE losses in a society where a functional social security system 
is absent. Without SO Es many of these social costs would go to the govern-
ments at different levels. 
2.2. Unfavorable Position in Taxation and Pricing 
Along with the marketization refonn, the traditional advantages that 
SO Es have enjoyed, such as easy access to key materials, credit, and captive 
markets, have gradually diminished. However, many disadvantages have per-
sisted and two of them are critical. 
The first one is the SOE's unfavorable taxation position. Although 
many tax refonns conducted in the past two decades were intended, with 
different degrees, to reduce the SOE heavy tax burden, taxes collected from the 
SOE sector have accounted for more than 70 percent of the total government 
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revenue (SSB, 1997, p. 238). By 1995, the SOE sector produced about 44 per-
cent of GDP, but contributed 71 percent ofnational fiscal revenue.3 Before the 
1994 tax reform, the nominal tax rate of corporate income for large and 
medium-sized SO Es was 55 percent, 35 percent for private enterprises, 33 per-
cent for foreign-invested enterprises, and progressive tax rates ranging from 7 
percent to 50 percent levied on small SOEs and collective enterprises, includ-
ing TVEs. The reform unified the corporate tax rate to 33 percent for all kinds of 
domestic enterprises (Beijing Review, 14-20 March 1994, p. 11). However, ex-
cept for these shifts in the nominal tax rate, the SO E's contributing share to the 
government revenue remained unchanged (see Table 1). 
Table 1: 
The Contribution Shares to Government Revenue by 
Ownership, 1988-1995 (percent) 
1988 1990 1993 1994 1995 
State-owned firms 71.6 71.3 71.6 71.4 71.1 
Collective firms 19.7 18.6 17.3 17.3 17.2 
(including TVEs) 
Households 5.8 4.7 5.5 5.6 6.1 
Other ownership 2.9 5.4 5.6 5.7 5.6 
Source: SSB ( 1997, p. 23 8). 
Note : Revenue from both domestic and foreign debts is excluded. 
The large difference between nominal and actual tax rates can be 
explained by three factors. First, there has been room for negotiating tax reduc-
tion between firms and local tax authorities (Guo, 1992). Second, tax evasion is 
much less difficult for those enterprises outside the state sector. According to 
a statistical analysis conducted by Chinese statistical officials, the accumu-
lated sum of verified evasions ofindustrial and commercial taxes from 1985 to 
1992 amounted to 98 .27 billion yuan, being equal to about 4 percent of total 
taxation income in each of these years (China Economic News, 23 Aug. 1993, 
p. 1 ). The evasion of enterprise income tax is much more difficult to verify and 
therefore, may be used more effectively by numerous small firms in the non-
state sector. The easier access to tax evasion enjoyed by the non-state firms 
puts SOEs at a relatively unfair position. And third, unlike for TVEs, wage 
expenditure is not counted as a business cost for SO Es and must be deducted 
from their net profit (after sales tax). It substantially expands the income-tax 
base of the SOEs (Guo, 1992). 
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The second disadvantage is associated with the so-called policy 
losses induced by the remaining price control of the state. According to Zhou 
( 1993, p. 70), of the 51 billion yuan of subsidies to loss-making SO Es in 1991, 
one-quarter was used to subsidize the energy producers who had to bear the 
very low controlled prices of their products. And another quarter was used in 
exchange for supplying other necessities at low state prices. In fact, many 
SO Es in the red are engaged in energy production (mainly coal mining), grain 
storage and processing, and the weapons sector. 
2.3. New Losses from New Investment Projects 
Many newly established projects in the SOE sector often become 
new sources of loss. These projects are typically established by local govern-
ments or industrial ministries and bureaus. The failures of these projects are 
the failure of China's state investment system, which has been characterized 
by bureaucratic co-ordination and has not yet been reformed successfully 
(Sun, l 997a, 1998). 
As pointed out in Sun ( 1998), the process of investment decision-
making in the state sector is a distribution process of rights to possess and use 
certain scarce state assets, including budget funds, bank loans, land, quotas 
of power, oil, and other key materials. The very first intention oflocal govern-
ments, ministries, and SO Es is to obtain and occupy as much investment and 
property from the distributive negotiation process as possible, so that they 
can reap future benefits and justify their power base. For example, if an SOE 
was initially assigned premises in a commercial part of a city (be it by negotia-
tion or only by chance), then its employees can get more bonuses simply by 
renting out the building. Often the consequence is that when trying to estab-
lish new investment projects, the decision-makers do not care much about 
whether or not the project will be profitable in the future. It is good if the project 
is profitable, but if it is not the loss will be born by the state anyway. Such an 
investment expansion drive, combined with the persistent soft-budget con-
straint, inevitably induces investment hunger and leads to inefficient invest-
ment projects (Zou and Sun, 1996). 
Before the refonn, the inefficiency of the state investment system was 
manifested in subjective decisions of the central leaders, poor preparation and 
monitoring, and widespread waste of scarce resources. In the reform era, fol-
lowing the increase oflocal autonomy, the inefficiency of the state investment 
system has been characterized by lasting and large-scale duplication of con-
struction at the national level, and the initiation of too many new projects at the 
expense of technical updating of existing assets. In the end, many projects 
have little value once their products face weak market demand and strong 
competition. There are numerous examples of this in almost all industrial sec-
tors. For example, by the end of 1990 China had built up 167 production lines 
for color television sets with an annual production capacity of20 million sets. 
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The annual real output was only 10 million, thus half of the production capac-
ity was idle. In 1993, China had 126 automobile factories and 5,000 re-equipping 
automobile factories with a theoretical capability of producing 1 million auto-
mobiles per year. However, most of these factories had no economy of scale by 
any standard and the average utilization ratio of capacity was less than 50 
percent (Sun, l 997a, p. 214). 
The lasting and severe investment inefficiency has caused continu-
ous worsening of SOE capital productivity, which can be clearly revealed by 
the change in the incremental capital-profit ratio. During 1985-1992, the net 
value of fixed assets of industrial SO Es with independent accounting systems 
increased from 398 billion yuan to 1,098 billion yuan, an increase of 700 billion 
yuan. While their realized pre-tax profits increased by only 61 billion yuan, 
from 133 billion yuan to 194 billion yuan. The incremental ratio of fixed assets 
to pre-tax profit is 11.5, indicating that every 11.5 yuan increase in fixed assets 
(net of depreciation) resulted in only one yuan increase in pre-tax profits. The 
fact that the ratio of pre-tax profits to total capital decreased from 23.8 to 9.7 
percent during this period (SSB, 1993, pp. 430, 437) can be, to a large extent, 
attributed to the failures of the state investment system. 
2.4. Capital Diversion and Statistics Bias 
Whether the official Chinese statistics are capable of providing a 
reliable account of SOE performance is an open question . One of the basic 
requirements for official statistics in any economy is to provide standardized 
and relatively stable data. These requirements may not allow the official statis-
tics to capture tactical activities used by firms in a rapidly changing economy. 
Among these tactical activities, several have significantly contributed to the 
under-reporting of SOE performance. These include implicit diversion of as-
sets and profits from SOEs, the SOE-foreign joint venture, and the SOE's in-
centives to under report their profit potential owing to the so-called ratchet 
effect. 
The implicit diversion of assets and profits from the SOE sector to the 
collective sector is induced by SOE social responsibilities. In order to create 
jobs for the children of their employees, most SO Es have to set up some new 
branches, making use of technologies and equipment of the parent SOEs, 
often free of charge. These branches are officially independent identities, which 
are usually registered as collective firms . In fact, these firms typically depend 
on the parent SOEs for survival and development. Once discovering such 
diversion as a convenient channel to avoid tax and to increase the incomes of 
the managers and employees, many SO Es also transfer part of their profits to 
these daughter firms in the name of subsidies and employment creation (Qian, 
1995). 
A survey (conducted in 1992) on 760 collective enterprises set up by 
SOEs in Shandong province showed that 54 percent of them were using 6.07 
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million yuan of parent SOE assets freely. Some SO Es tend to transfer profitable 
products and technologies to their daughter subsidiaries (Guo, 1992, p.49). 
Often such subsidiary companies make profits by simply selling the low-price 
planned goods from the parent SO Es at going market prices. 
Thanks to many preferential policies for Sino-foreign joint venture 
and their own expansion drive, SO Es have had strong incentives to set up joint 
ventures with foreign firms. Such ventures are not counted as a part of the SOE 
sector in official statistics, although the SOE in such a joint venture is often the 
de facto majority investor or controller. Jn addition, many of the (more success-
ful) SO Es have been transformed, partly or fully, into joint stock companies, 
which is classified into the category of "other ownership firms" despite the 
state holding the majority share. Jn 1994, for instance, the output value of these 
state share-holding companies was equal to 17 .6 percent of that of the SOE 
sector (SSB, 1995, p. 375). Therefore, it is likely that the official statistics suffer 
selection bias in reporting the poor performance of the SO Es. 
SOE management has been monitored by responsibility contract dur-
ing the reform era. This monitoring system seems to have transferred the ratchet 
effect from output target to profit target. A higher profit achievement of any 
year means that a higher target will be set up for the next year, which has been 
vividly likened as "lashing the faster oxen". As a consequence, SOEs have a 
tendency ofunder-reporting their profitability to a certain degree, often report-
ing that they are just breaking-even allowing for a better negotiating position 
in setting future profit targets (Zhou, 1993, p. 71 ). 
Jn comparison, TYEs have few such concerns and, in fact, the con-
trary seems more likely. Local government officials tend to encourage their 
subordinates to exaggerate profits of TYEs, which can be used as achieve-
ments to speed up the promotion of their own administrative career and to 
compete for more bank loans. Though it is impossible to have an accurate 
picture, one recent news report may be informative: the director of the statis-
tics bureau of Changzhou city in Jiangsu province, one of the areas with the 
highest level of TYE development, was arrested because he invented high 
figures for local TYEs to reach projected profit targets (The Chinese Times, 
June 15, 1995). Clearly, he might have been encouraged, even pressured by 
some higher level officials. 
To sum up, considering all these factors as discussed above, we 
come to a conclusion that the actual performance or efficiency of SO Es may 
not have been as bad as indicated by the statistics. An additional observation 
is that it was SO Es, not TYEs, that typically operated at the frontier of new 
product development (Jefferson, 1993, p.3). 
3. Conditions Contributing to the TVE Miracle 
The TYE phenomenon is unique in the sense that the emergence of rural 
entrepreneurs and enterprises has not been experienced in any other country 
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on such a large scale and at such a rapid rate . Its roots can be traced back to the 
late 1950s, but its development was not truly noticeable until the late 1970s 
when China began to carry out reforms and to open up to the outside world. 
The TYE development so far is not an outcome of any carefully designed 
policy or plan. The government policy changed from tolerance to encourage-
ment during the 1980s, only after recognizing that the TYE was a vehicle to 
increase rural income, and more importantly, to absorb a large amount of rural 
labor surplus without much need for state investment - a serious problem 
which had been confronting the Chinese governments at all levels (see Jin and 
Qian 1998 for more details). 
Generally speaking, there has been an overall favorable environment 
for TYE growth during the reform period, providing both incentives and disci-
plines for township and village governments and TYE managers in the process 
of TYE development. 
3.1. Hard Budget Constraints Confronted by Township and 
Village Communities 
In China, the central, provincial, municipal, prefecture, and county 
governments all have sufficient authority to regulate markets through adminis-
trative methods and to be involved in credit decisions through both vertical 
and regional accountability (dual coordination). Ex ante, governments at the 
level of the county or above are directly involved in the formulation of credit 
plans and can direct specialized banks to make loans. Ex post, governments 
have the authority to decide whether or not SO Es should pay back the loans. 
Township and village governments (TYGs) have no such authority. 
A TYG cannot protect its TYEs by erecting trade barriers to keep out competi-
tion simply because the market within a community is both too small and 
limited. TYGs have no access to the state banking system, because all town-
ships and villages are historically institutionalized as part of the traditional 
rural sector whereas the banking system is a part of the modem urban sector. 
Likewise, all staff members of state banks are registered in the urban residency 
registration system and have no links with the rural sector except through 
business dealings. 
As a consequence, state banks have typically followed the commer-
cial principles in making loans to TYEs. Often, they ask TYGs to act as guaran-
tors of investment loans. If a township or village has a poor credit repayment 
record, state banks can refuse the loan application and, additionally, they can 
withhold interest payments and some of the principal from the bank accounts 
of the community or its TYEs. Each TYG well understands that a community 
may be able to delay debt repayments over the short term, but that it cannot 
delay them indefinitely. Meanwhile, a poor credit record implies that the com-
munity must depend on self-financing for future development and debt servic-
ing. This is not possible even in agricultural communities, for which bank 
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credits are needed seasonally for the purchase such inputs as seeds, chemical 
fertilizers and pesticides, etc. 
The above facts force township and village communities to confront 
the pressure of market competition and a hard budget constraint. Though 
subsidizing across TVEs within a community is possible, the extent of such 
subsidies is very limited. Thus, in reaction to the economic austerity in 1989 
and 1990, several million TVEs were closed down or taken over by other TVEs 
(Zou and Sun, 1998, Table 1 ). In contrast, the losses among SO Es soared, 
although only a handful actually went bankrupt. A 120 billion yuan credit relief 
operation was initiated in the fourth quarter of 1989 to write off non-performing 
inter-enterprise credits, mainly inter-SOE credits (Portyakov 1991 ). 
3.2. Initiatives and Supports of Community Government 
Core TVEs are typically initiated or directly established by TVGs. 
Motivated by revenue generation, employment creation, and the strong desire 
of the community for improving living standards and increasing wealth, TV Gs 
have been strongly enthusiastic developing TVEs. This enthusiasm has been 
further strengthened by an increasing responsibility for improvement of local 
education, infrastructure, and social welfare, which have been gradually shifted 
from upper levels of government to TV Gs. 
Three critical contributions of TV Gs to TVEs have been outlined by 
Chang and Wang (1994, pp. 443-44). First, because TV Gs are part of a large 
governmental system with broad powers, and because of the long tradition of 
authoritarian government in China, the full support of TVG can provide com-
munity members and other TVE stakeholders with a sense of security which is 
needed to achieve long-term development. Second, TV Gs can offer managerial 
inputs to TVEs in several ways. Because the market is in its infancy and ordi-
nary citizens who have suitable market-oriented talents are a scare resource, 
TV Gs are essential in the organization of major economic and political activi-
ties within their jurisdiction. Without a market or other social mechanisms, 
TV Gs are often the only available local institutions with the authority to settle 
disputes which arise in the process creating TVEs. Third, TVGs can play an 
essential role in gaining access to outside resources, particularly bank loans. 
In addition to these three contributions, TV Gs are not only the guarantors of 
TVE loans, but also the executors of the collective financing and debt repay-
ment system. This collective financing and debt repayment system represents 
another support for TVE growth. All the funds required for the start-up of a 
new TVE can be borrowed from existing TVEs with the help of the TVG (Wong 
et al., 1995). This system also offers TV Gs the power to initiate and co-ordinate 
internal reorganizations or takeovers so that communities can avoid the social 
and economic costs of bankruptcy and of takeovers by outsiders (Sun, l 997b; 
Zou and Sun 1998). 
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3.3. Integration into World Economy 
Geographically, TVEs are most developed in the coastal provinces of 
Guangdong, Fujian, Zhejiang, and Jiangsu. These provinces, both historically 
and today, have close links with the overseas Chinese in Hong Kong, Taiwan 
and Southeast Asia. TVE development in these provinces has well fitted in the 
requirement of international division oflabor and in the considerable compara-
tive advantages of rural China. 
For overseas Chinese investors, the attractions ofTVEs in the coastal 
areas manifest themselves in (a) a large number of cheap and well-disciplined 
Chinese rural laborers released from the successful agricultural reform and 
development in the early 1980s; (b) various preferential treatments in tax ex-
emption, currency conversion and remission of profit granted by the open-
door policy; (c) flexible and relatively convenient approval procedures for 
their investment projects in the rural society; (d) proximity to their bases; and 
(e) cultural convenience and traditional family or kinship network. It is also 
conceivable that (a), (b) and (c) are attractive to other foreign investors. 
Foreign investments have played an important role in TVE develop-
ment. Foreign investors have brought in scarce foreign capital and relatively 
advanced technology and management skills, and their marketing networks 
abroad provide easy access to international markets. Compared with domestic 
buyers, there are less problems of the (widely spread) inter-enterprise debts, 
because exports also guarantee payment, as it is due mostly upon delivery. 
Thanks to the compatible incentives and comparative advantages, 
TVE achievement in exports has been most impressive. Table 2 presents TVE 
export growth in terms of both total scale and relative share. It can be seen that 
during the ten year period of 1988-97, the TVE's shares in the total national 
export increased from 16.9 to 46.3 percent. The TVE's total export value in-
creased from US$8.02 to 84.6 billion. This is equivalent to an annual growth 
rate of26.5 percent in terms of US dollars, despite the devaluation of yuan from 
3.7 to 8.3 yuan per US dollar. It is worth mentioning also that the TVE's export 
growth has been largely contributed by the TVEs with dominant community 
ownership (People's Daily, 6 Feb. 1998). 
Table 2: 
The Growth of TVE Export, 1988-1997 
1988 1991 1993 1995 1997 
TYE export (billion US dollars) 8.02 14.8 38.I 64.5 84.6 
TYE share in total export(%) 16.9 20.6 41.5 43.3 46.3 
Average exchange rate (yuan/$ I) 3.718 5.327 5.761 8.369 8.270 
Sources: TVE Yearbook (1990, p. 20 ; 1996, pp. 102-103), SSS (1993, p. 633; 1997, p. 
587), and People 's Daily (5 Feb and 22 March 1998). 
Note : TYE export includes direct and indirect (e.g. in the form of subcontracting with 
SO Es and foreign companies) exports, and charges on processing for foreign firms (TVE 
Yearbook, 1996, pp. 122-123 ). 
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3.4. Unique Market Opportunities 
To a large extent, TYE success also depends on the unique opportu-
nities created by China's market liberalization especially relaxation of state 
monopoly over industry. The protected industrial sector was effectively opened 
to new entrants beginning in 1979. A large number of TVEs started up and 
rushed to take advantage of sharing the monopoly profits in the industrial 
sector. For these early entrants, the average rate ofnet profit on capital was 32 
percent and the total rate of profit and tax per unit of capital was 40 percent 
(SSB, 1993, pp. 396-397). Of course, continued TVE entry gradually created and 
intensified competition, inducing monopoly profits to decrease and finally to 
vanish. However, the windfall profits enjoyed by early entrants in the late 
1970s and early 1980s greatly contributed to the TVE takeoff. 
In the early years of TYE development, there were many empty niches 
in the consumer goods market (processed foods, clothes, etc.) and primarily 
processed products markets, mainly owing to lasting shortages induced by 
the inefficient command economy. Not surprisingly, TVEs jumped to meet de-
mands of these markets. Moreover, the rapid economic development in both 
urban and rural areas has created a whole series of new markets - a good 
example is building construction and building materials production in both 
urban and rural areas, where TYEs have dominated these industries since the 
mid- l 980s (Naughton, 1996, pp. 150-151 ). 
Meanwhile, the two-track system of market and planning has also 
eased constraints, providing TYEs with access to raw materials and market 
shares outside the state plan. They can afford higher input prices by setting up 
higher prices for outputs, or by simply using low quality input to produce 
cheap and poor quality goods to meet the corresponding demands. 
3.5. Flexibility due to Size and Accounting System 
Most TYEs are small in size and engage in labor intensive industries 
with low asset specificity. By 1996, the average size of township enterprises 
was 73 employees per firm and that of village enterprises was 26 employees per 
firm . In the earlier years, the average TYE size certainly was smaller (SSB, 1997, 
pp. 399-400). This makes them very flexible to react to market changes, to 
switch products, and to catch new market opportunities. 
The accounting system in TYEs has been much Jess standard and 
strict than in SO Es. Only the TYE owners are accountable for bookkeeping, 
and not all of the income and expenditure need to go through banks. Thus, 
they can use such flexible financial and bookkeeping systems to develop their 
business. TYEs typically pay the highest salaries to their marketing staff, which 
can be more than ten times an average worker's income. TVEs have enjoyed 
the flexibility to pay higher commission, send gifts, or even offer bribes to 
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government or SOE officials so as to get low-price inputs or materials in short-
age and to expand market shares of their products. 
In contrast, these conveniences have rarely been possible for SOEs. 
The accounting systems of SO Es have been much more standardized, and is 
controlled by a nationally uniform accounting inspection system -with care-
ful supervision of such items as wages and travel expenses. 
3.6. Support from SOEs 
The growth of TYEs in peri-urban areas has been facilitated by direct 
co-operation between urban SO Es and rural TYEs, mainly in the form of sub-
contracting. In the suburban areas of Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai, an esti-
mated 60-80 percent of TYE output was produced by firms subcontracting with 
large urban SO Es in the early 1980s (Industrial Almanac, 1949-1984, p. 50). In 
Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces, where TYEs have dominated the local econo-
mies since the mid- I 980s, the proportions were only slightly lower in the mid-
I 980s. Linkages with Shanghai SOEs in these two provinces have played a 
decisive role in their TYE development (Tao, 1988, p. 100). 
Why are urban SOEs motivated to cooperate closely with TYEs? 
Naughton (1996, pp. 155-156) gives three plausible reasons, namely diversified 
supply, cheap labor and land use, and the flexibility to escape some rigid 
controls of the state sector. 
4. Ownership and Governance Structures of SOEs and TVEs 
It has become popular to view ownership as a bundle of rights and 
the firm as a nexus of contracts among various owners of different production 
factors (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). Ownership structure involves many di-
mensions, among which the most important are the allocations of residual 
control rights and rights to residual benefits. An ownership structure that is 
consistent with the objective of firm-value maximization may require that the 
residual claimants, who contract for the residual benefits, bear the residual 
risks, the "risk of the difference between stochastic inflows of resources and 
promised payments to agents" (Fama and Jensen, 1983, p.302). 
The governance structure of a firm refers to "the ways in which sup-
pliers of finance to [the firm] assure themselves of getting a return on their 
investment." (Shleifer and Yishny, 1997). The governance structure of the SOEs 
is weak because the state, in the role of financing SO Es, has no assurance to 
get adequate returns on the investments. The governance structure of the 
TYEs is better defined and appears to be much more effective. The main suppli-
ers of finance to the TYEs are the township or village households and outside 
creditors. Acting on their self-interests, these finance suppliers have all the 
incentives to make sure that their investments will not be appropriated. Alter-
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natively, without an adequate governance structure, a TYE would find it very 
hard to get any project financed by outside creditors. 
Separation of ownership and control, or, in more intuitive terminol-
ogy, of finance and management, is likely to lead to agency problems. This 
refers to self-interested managerial behavior that imposes agency costs on the 
firm or on the absentee owners' welfare. Optimal incentive contracting may 
ameliorate some of these costs, but owing to informational asymmetries, moni-
toring costs, or other market imperfections, agency problems are in most cases 
inherent in the separation of ownership and management. 
As with China's SOEs, the agency problems are further aggravated 
by the conflicting roles assigned to the managers and to the supervising bod-
ies, and by the fact that SOEs' assets are akin to public goods that suffer from 
free-riding problems (Jefferson, 1998). On the other hand, TYEs are much less 
affected by these problems. The TVG usually has close relationships with the 
managers of the TY Es. Monitoring costs are lower, and thanks to their close 
relationships, information could be shared by the member firms within the 
community. Furthermore, incentives can be aligned more easily because of 
member firms' common interests and the fact the TVEs share financial risks 
under the umbrella of the TYG (Zou and Sun, 1998). However, along with the 
expansion of the TV Es as they become more successful, the traditional close 
ties among the community member firms may be loosened. Powerful TVEs may 
eventually free themselves from the control of the TVG, and new conflicts 
among the TYEs or between TYEs and the TVG could emerge. These would 
likely result in more serious agency problems as well. 
4.1. Problems Inherent in SOE Ownership and Governance 
Structures and Choices for SOE Reform 
An SOE is, by legal definition, owned by the Chinese people. Being 
owned by 1.2 billion people inevitably means nobody directly owns the firm . 
As analyzed in Jefferson ( 1998), this widely dispersed and ambiguous owner-
ship structure induces the excludability problem. In different periods and fol-
lowing the policy shifts, SOEs have been subject to opportunistic behaviors 
and appropriations by those who have direct control of or influence on the 
firms ' assets. These appropriations may include, e.g., asset stripping by man-
agers and other insiders; shirking by workers; predatory taxes, fees and bribes 
levied by government officials; and non-pecuniary benefits for employees and 
their relatives in the forms of housing and social services. 
While the 1.2 billion people have no way to exercise direct control 
over SO Es, the real control rights are delegated by the central government to 
ministries, local governments at different levels and their industrial bureaus. In 
order to limit the opportunistic behaviors of managers and officials at lower 
levels, the governments at higher levels have sufficient reasons to keep tight 
control over SOE operation. Thus government interventions become inevi-
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table. On the other hand, the state has to bear the losses made by SOEs in 
return, assuming an unlimited liability for SO Es. The asymmetry between lower 
jurisdictions that are interested in extracting value from the SOE pool and 
higher jurisdictions that replenish value, through either direct subsidies or the 
state bank system, creates a serious moral-hazard problem for opportunist 
local officials. It has induced an accumulation of bad loans and non-perfor-
mance debt within the SOE sector that renders the financial system vulnerable 
to external shocks and crises (Jefferson, 1998). 
How should China reform the ownership and governance structures 
of SO Es? Diversified alternatives have been proposed by scholars and experi-
mented with in China, which include selling, leasing, and management and 
employee buyout (MEBO) of small and some medium SO Es, SOE equitization 
through equity joint venture with foreigners, and restructuring SO Es into share-
holding companies. It is widely acknowledged that China' s enterprise reform is 
a progressive process of reassigning property rights, reducing transaction 
costs, and exchanging these rights among officials, managers within the firm, 
and outside entrepreneurs and firms in search of sales, mergers, and acquisi-
tions (Sun, l 997b, pp.16-23 ; Gu, 1997; Jefferson et al., 1998). Though SOE 
property rights are not well-defined, the entering of SO Es into an economy 
where market-mediated exchanges of property rights are possible does define 
the opportunity cost of state ownership (Jefferson, 1998). The increasing op-
portunity costs of SOEs have motivated and will further stimulate the SOE 
reform in China. 
4.2. Relative Advantages of TVE Owners/tip and Governance 
Structure 
TVEs are under the direct jurisdiction of their TVGs . The 
government-enterprise relationship is much simpler and more direct than that 
of SO Es. In terms of the owner-management relationship, community members 
as owners do have incentives to monitor the TVG officials and TYE manage-
ment, though the real effectiveness varies across different communities. Be-
cause community members, as owners, possess the right to derive both short-
run and long-run residual benefits from the TVE's operation, when necessary 
they are willing to give up short-run benefits, such as dividends, in exchange 
for long-run more profitable benefits. Here, the term "benefits" can be broadly 
defined as including job opportunities and security, pension funds, and com-
munal welfare programs in housing, health care, irrigation, road construction, 
and other infrastructure (Chang and Wang, 1994; Sun, l 997b ). 
Although the residual control rights exercised by TVG may imply a 
certain risk of bureaucratization, the control by the government over imple-
mentation and coordination of internal reorganization, or over the takeover 
process, does sidestep the social and economic costs of bankruptcy through 
166 PEROTTI-SUN-ZOU 
court action or of takeover by outsiders. This control is quite similar to that 
exercised by the main bank in a Japanese Keiretsu. 
Because the residual control rights of TVEs within a community is 
held by TV Gs, the community becomes a de facto corporation or "mini con-
glomerate'', facing a hard budget constraint (Section 3.1 ). Under the pressure 
of intense competition, this arrangement can facilitate a consensus among 
community members, TVG officials and TYE managers and workers to maximize 
profits even by sacrificing all or part of wage income. Moreover, because a 
community is diversified in an economic sense, it can diversify the business 
risk. A township or village can rather easily create several small-scale TVEs in 
manufacturing, agriculture, commerce, construction, and transportation and 
then expand the size of these TV Es (Zou and Sun, 1998). 
A community can be seen as a small society, in which the citizens/ 
owners can vote by a show of hands in semi-competitive elections for commu-
nity officials. In wealthier villages and villages that enjoy a large TYE economy, 
this is particularly true (O'Brien, 1994, pp. 47 and 51; The Economist, 2 Nov. 
1996, pp. 81-83; Howell, 1998). The villagers may also directly participate in 
discussions with community leaders. These avenues contribute to the resolu-
tion of the agency problems and help reduce costs of organization. 
A community can also be seen as a corporation, governed by, e.g., a 
system of responsibility contracts or subcontracts. Such a system can be 
arranged between the community representative assemblies and the commu-
nity government, between the government and the TVEs, and within the TVEs. 
These contracts and subcontracts have facilitated the solution of monitoring 
problems within the community and within the TVEs (Lin, 1995; Wong et al., 
1995). 
For the large-scale TVEs requiring access to domestic and interna-
tional capital markets, a further clarification of property rights is necessary. 
However, this does not mean that the only alternative is the distribution of 
shares among individuals. The community as a collective equity holder and 
the TVG as the executive equity holder may still possess comparative advan-
tages. Even if each citizen becomes a shareholder, it may still be more efficient 
if the TVG can act as the representative oflocal shareholders in the exercise of 
their residual control rights over the TVEs (Vermeer 1996). In this connection, 
the democratization recently exercised in China's villages is of decisive impor-
tance for future TYE development. 
4.3. Disadvantages Inherent in TVE Property Rigltts 
Arrangement 
The so called "mechanism degeneration" of TVEs has been widely 
reported since the early 1990s (see, e.g. Ministry of Agriculture, 1997). Many 
aspects of mechanism degeneration can be linked to the problems inherent in 
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TYE ownership and governance structures. Among them, two are often pointed 
out. 
First, TYGs are not purely economic actors. As TYEs mature, the 
objectives ofTYG officials are coming increasingly into conflict with those of 
TYE managers, although initially these two sets of objectives were quite simi-
lar (Ren et al., 1990; Wang 1990; Shi and You, 1997). TYGs have assigned 
priority to raising employment, local prosperity and financial revenue. This 
could hinder the stable, long-tenn development of TY Es. The powerful control 
rights of TY Gs could thus lead to unfavourable interference into TYE manage-
ment. TY Gs also seem to be shifting the responsibility for the overall develop-
ment of rural communities onto TYEs. As a result, many TYEs are now also 
experiencing redundant employment and increasingly heavy social burdens. 
In this, they are becoming quite similar to SO Es in many ways (Byrd and Lin 
1990, pp. 125,304and351, Shi and You, 1997;XuandZhang, 1997). 
Second, bureaucratization and corruption among TYG officials and 
TYE managers are growing. In those townships and villages where the devel-
opment of grassroots democratization has lagged behind, the problem of who 
monitors the monitors becomes increasingly serious. This is because there is a 
lack of effective checking and restraint devices to curb corruption behavior of 
those increasingly powerful TYG officials. For example, many TVEs are becom-
ing "purses" of their TY Gs, required to pay all sort of expenses for TYG offi-
cials. And many TYE managers are stripping TYE assets for their own interests 
(Shi and y OU, 1997). 
Although there have been supervisions from county governments as 
highlighted in Che and Qian (I 998), this kind of monitoring may be limited due 
to the problem ofinfonnation asymmetry. The restraints from county govern-
ments are mainly based on disciplines of the Communist Party. This may not 
make sense for most officials at grassroots level, because the probability for 
them to get promotion into a formal bureaucrat is tenuous. Indeed, compared 
with the economic and social rents they enjoy from the TYEs, the career of 
being a low-rank bureaucrat is not that attractive. In addition, this monitoring 
is bound to be weak because of the communication difficulty in rural areas and 
there being usually a large number ofTYEs and TY Gs in a county. 
The existence of these problems calls for further refonns of TYE own-
ership and governance structures and for grassroots democratization (Sun, 
1999). 
5. Differences in Personnel Systems and Labor Relations 
Another important reason for the different performance of SO Es and 
TYEs lies in the different personnel and employment systems, which assigns 
the roles of managers and shapes the basic labor-management relations in 
SOEs and TVEs. Generally speaking, unlike in the TYE sector, there is no 
significant labor market for both SOE managers and workers. An SOE manager 
is not just an entrepreneur but also a bureaucrat and the chief of the SOE 
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community. He/she has to cope with and co-ordinate conflicting interests among 
different stakeholders, inside and outside the SOE, and within the community. 
SOE employees, as the inside stakeholders of their SOE, have enjoyed a spe-
cial set of social privileges, are more influential in certain areas, and are more 
difficult to manage than their counterparts in TVEs. 
5.1 Urban versus Rural Social Status 
China has practiced a very strict personnel control system. People are 
divided into different social statuses, among which the most significant differ-
entiation is between urban and rural ones. Each Chinese citizen is registered 
either as urban or rural resident under a household residence registration sys-
tem. The registration status depends on one's mother's status at birth. This 
status can only be changed due to a promotion to certain level in military 
service, university enrollment, or marriage plus a repeated change-of-status 
application and waiting for many years. As urban citizens, their food supply is 
subsidized and employment is guaranteed by the state. Furthermore, whether 
a citizen is employed in a SOE or in an urban collectively owned enterprise 
(COE) will further determine the different levels of his or her employee benefits. 
Only are urban citizens entitled to work in SO Es and to the associated welfare 
benefits, such as subsidized low-rent houses, life-time employment, health 
care, retirement pension, children's schooling and employment, and so on. 
This systematic arrangement is why Chinese peasants often say that the so-
cialism has been realized only in urban China and in the state sector. This 
arrangement establishes a specific incentive structure for urban Chinese and 
SOE employees, allowing them to enjoy benefits and costs packages that are 
different from those for the rural Chinese. 
A positive extemality of this arrangement, though, is that by restrict-
ing the employment opportunity of rural citizens in cities, this system helps 
create a more competitive rural labor market for TVEs. 
5.2. Personnel/Employment System in the SOE Sector 
For both SOE managers and workers there has been no pressure or 
threat from the labor market until significant layoffs took place in 1996.4 The 
long-lasting reform over the lifetime employment system has had a limited 
effect. The system of contract employment was adopted in 1986, but is only 
applicable to the newly recruited workers. Before 1989, almost 90 percent of the 
employees in the state sector had permanent job tenure. Until 1994, only 26 
percent of SOE employees were on employment contracts (SSB, 1997, p. 113). 
It is also widely reported that there has been little real difference between 
permanent employees and those contracted prior to 1996. One may argue that 
the lifetime employment may not necessarily result in lower efficiency with 
reference to the evidence from Japan, but the difference is that Japanese firms 
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are constantly facing pressure from market competition and the threat of take-
over and bankruptcy whereas Chinese SOEs can depend on the ultimate pro-
tector, the state, for solving their troubles. 
Managerial appointments in the SOE sector have been tightly con-
trolled by the Party committees at different levels. Although an increasing 
number of technicians have been appointed as SOE managers in recent years, 
political consideration is still an important factor in promotion, and the domi-
nant feature of heads of Party committees is that they have either an adminis-
trative or military background (Qian, 1995, pp. 228-230). 
Although an evolving managerial labor market seems to emerge in the 
SOE sector (Groves, et al., 1995), its significance should not be overestimated 
because of the following two reasons. First, the entry to the market is far from 
free . According to an official survey conducted in 1995, about 80 percent of 
SOE managers, especially those of large and medium SOEs, are appointed 
through political and administrative channels (Window, March I 0, 1995, p. l 0). 
The social status of SOE managers has been continuously defined by their 
ranks within the hierarchy of Party and government. For instance, some man-
agers oflarge SO Es enjoy the rank of vice-minister. Second, dismissals rarely 
happen. It is a well-known practice in China for government officials or SOE 
managers usually to only be promoted and not demoted unless they commit 
important economic crimes or political mistakes. Usually, those managers who 
suffer certain difficulties in their SO Es will be transferred to work in other SO Es 
with a similar position as before. Only an early retirement results in an effective 
exit. Such a turnover cannot form real pressure or be a threat to most managers. 
Quite ironically, the competence of an SOE manager may be judged in an 
adverse way according to the turnover numbers: the more firms he has man-
aged, the less professionally competent he may be. The selection of managers 
through bidding is only used in some small SOEs. These facts indicate that 
there are still both severe entry and exit barriers to the SOE managerial labor 
market. 
5.3. Employment System in the TVE sector 
For TVE employees, there is no guarantee oflifetirne employment, the 
so-called "iron rice bowl". There have been an increasing number of rural 
surplus laborers who are released by agricultural development and pushed by 
regional development imbalance. Therefore, the rural labor market for TVEs 
has been highly competitive. TVEs can employ workers from both local com-
munities and other places outside their communities. Thanks to the competi-
tion, there are nci generous welfare benefits, housing in particular, for TVE 
employees. The unemployment and retirement insurance typically lies on their 
contracted land in their home villages. As a consequence, TVEs have enjoyed 
low labor cost and a clear management objective. In the meantime, a competi-
tive labor market plus a land contracting system induces high labor mobility, 
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the opportunity cost ofunemployment for TYE workers being much lower than 
for SOE workers. If unemployed, the worst thing for them is to return to farm-
ing. This mobility combined with the bottom-line insurance may help reduce 
the problem oflabor-management conflicts. 
5.4. Triple Role of SOE Managers 
An SOE manager not only has to be an entrepreneur but also a gov-
ernment official and the chief of the SOE community. The manager is a govern-
ment official because he/she is assigned by the government bodies to be an 
agent of the state to manage the business of the SOE and to protect the interest 
of the owner, the state. As government officials, managers are likely to be 
motivated by administrative promotions, respected social statuses, and the 
associated fringe benefits. Although the cash salary for an SOE manager is 
typically fixed to be no more than three times the average salary of regular 
workers, he/she can be compensated by many non-pecuniary benefits such as 
an elevated social status, large house, and other luxurious on-the-job con-
sumption. The levels of these non-pecuniary benefits are mainly determined 
by his/her official rank in the bureaucratic hierarchy. This incentive structure 
serves the purpose of inducing SOE managers to identify themselves with the 
government and the state, and to protect the interest of the state in their SO Es. 
The role of bureaucrat is bound to conflict with the role of entrepre-
neur in any economy, because politicians or bureaucrats have to, in most 
cases, give priority to political control, job generation, and complaints of their 
constituencies rather than to profit maximization of SO Es under their control 
(Boycko et al., 1996). 
As we analyzed in Section 2.1, each SOE, in particular large or medium 
sized, lives as a resident community or small society, and the manager naturally 
assumes the role of the mayor or chief of the community. Within a community, 
the power balance appears to have been well established. The Party Committee 
has played a key role in the appointment of upper level personnel, particularly 
the assistant directors and mid-level cadres. The Employees' Congress has 
played a dominant role in dismissal decision of workers and in distribution of 
social welfare. Employees also have a large influence over the decision con-
cerning wage and bonus differentials (Jefferson et al., 1998). For the commu-
nity members, the top concern is their employment security and welfare maxi-
mization, which is in conflict with profit maximization. 
By way of a compromise between the roles of bureaucrat and entre-
preneur, SOE managers prefer to develop smooth relationships with their supe-
riors . These managers tolerate many kinds of predatory demands from their 
superiors, and pay various bills and unauthorized charges imposed by these 
above, thereby adding to the losses of SO Es. Table 3 presents a comparison of 
initial distribution patterns of769 surveyed SO Es in 1981 and 1989. We see in 
the table that there is a category of "other expenses", the share of which almost 
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doubles from 1981 to 1989. Among the other expenses, the unauthorized fee 
imposed by superior bodies is a major component (Tang, 1992, p.9). 
Driven by the interest of the SOE community and thanks to the in-
creasing autonomy along with the reform, SOE managers now have more dis-
cretion to increase wages, bonuses, and other community welfare at the ex-
pense of earnings. It is reported that during 1986-90, the realized pre-tax profit 
of those SO Es within the state budget (key large and medium SO Es) increased 
by only 3.2 percent while the total wages and bonuses of their employees went 
up by 91 percent (Survey Report, 1992, p.4). It is also frequently reported that 
some loss-making SO Es continuously pay bonuses to their workers by using 
bank loans. 
The unbalanced increase of employees' benefits have failed to result 
in better performances, because of the effective "lower level bargaining be-
tween managers and workers at the factory level," both of whom seek to maxi-
mize profit retention while distributing it as equally as possible within the firm 
(Walder, 1987, p.41). 
Table 3: 
Initial Distribution of Net Revenue in 769 Surveyed SOEs in 
Sichuan Province (percent) 
1981 1989 
Profit (after sale tax) 4623 33.03 
Sales tax 24.34 24.69 
Interest payment 2.13 924 
Wages 2028 24.70 
Other expenses 4.50 8.50 
Total net revenue 100.00 100.00 
Source: Tang ( 1992). 
Note: This survey is conducted by Economic Institute of China Academy of 
Social Sciences. The sum of shares is not equal to l 00 because of rounding and 
compiling errors in the raw data. 
5.5. Simple Role of TVE managers 
By contrast, the role ofTVE manager is simple. A bureaucratic career 
has very limited possibility, and thus is hardly attractive, especially for those in 
rich regions. The tasks and objectives of a TYE manager or management team 
are typically well specified in a contract between them and their TVG. They 
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only need to report to the TYG. This simple principal-agent contract also makes 
their work considerably easier and more efficient. 
The major compensation for TYE managers includes direct pecuniary 
benefits in various forms such as higher wages, year-end bonuses and con-
tract fulfillment bonuses. These bonuses are closely linked with the TYE per-
formance and thus can be considered as a kind of sharing scheme of residual 
benefits. Typically, the bonuses of TYE managers are not only related to their 
own TYE performance but also decided through comparison with the perfor-
mance levels of other TY Es in the same township or village. This horizontal 
comparison has generated competition pressure among managers of different 
TY Es (Wu et al., 1990, p. 332). 
TYE managers also face competition and threat from the managerial 
labor market. They are not guaranteed lifetime status, and their terms are fixed 
for a limited period. As a result, over time, entrepreneurship has developed in 
the TYE sector. TYE managers are becoming more experienced and profession-
ally competent, and more capable to deal with market competition. 
The evaluation practices are also different in the SOE sector and TYE 
sector. TYE managers are evaluated mainly by fulfillment of profit targets. But 
in the SOE sector, under the current institutional arrangement and market con-
ditions, it is hard for the superiors to figure out which losses are caused by 
external factors, which are inherited problems of the SOE, and which are result-
ant from the incapable mangers. For an SOE manager, it is easy to list a number 
of objective reasons that can serve as excuses for poor performance. 
5.6. Labor-Management Relations in SOEs and TVEs 
For SOE workers, there has been a lack of incentives and pressure to 
work hard because of the lasting egalitarian practice of income distribution, the 
lifetime employment system, and the public goods property of SOE assets. 
In comparison with TYE workers, SOE workers are less disciplined 
and may be more difficult to manage. The labor-management conflict can turn 
into a personal one. For instance, if the manager decides to penalize an undis-
ciplined worker, the worker may take it personally and make trouble or brandish 
threats to the manager and even the manager's family. The worker believes that 
any loss of the enterprises caused by his undisciplined performance will be 
borne by the state while any personal punishment against him will have to be 
borne by him individually. This adds to Jefferson's ( 1998) list an additional 
manifestation ofnondiminishability property of the SOE public goods, which 
indicates that one person's overconsumption need not seriously constrain the 
ability of others to extract value from the SOE. Because of this nondiminishability, 
the undisciplined worker has a rational reason to think that if the manager 
decides to punish him then it must be out of the manager's personal intention. 
There is nearly a consensus among workers and managers about this. More-
over, because of such obvious nondiminishability, the punished worker can 
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often get sympathy from other workers. There have even been examples where 
managers were in ju red or even killed, by workers during reforms in some places. 
Meanwhile, managers have no incentive to place the workers under strict 
disciplines at all. As a consequence, pervasive shirking and free riding become 
inevitable and widespread in the SOE sector. 
TYE workers are much easier to disciplined and to manage. They 
have sufficient motivation and face strong pressure to work hard. They are 
motivated by the close link between their wages and performance. Piece-rate 
and team-responsibility-wage systems are common in the TYE sector. As for 
pressures, TYE employees are almost without exception contract workers, hired 
for the year or the season with no job security as there are many others waiting 
for jobs. They often work longer hours and much harder than SOE workers do, 
because iftheir performance is not satisfactory, their job contracts may not be 
renewed or even terminated in advance (Ho, 1994). Collectively, if business 
goes wrong, everybody in the firm will lose their job. Therefore, TYE workers 
well understand that their own future is closely tied with that of the firm, with 
which they have to share the risk. 
The outstanding performance of TYE workers may be further explained 
by a kind of group or mutual monitoring at the horizontal level. This mechanism 
is induced by the threat of collective unemployment caused by the failure of 
their enterprise, in academic words, by a "cooperative culture" within a small 
commons (Weitzman and Xu, 1994; Jefferson, 1998). 
6. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we have presented a comprehensive account of the 
issue of SOE-TYE comparison in China. The account is based on a major 
survey on the literature as well as first hand analysis. It is concluded that 
though TVEs have been confronted with comparative disadvantages in the 
areas of technologies, labor skills and education levels, accesses to bank loans, 
official channels of information and key material distribution, they have en-
joyed and established more important advantages over SOEs. These can be 
summarized in the following major points: (a) Hard budget constraints to TYEs 
in general and to each township and village community in particular, whereas 
SOE budget constraints remain soft. (b) Relatively compatible interests and 
incentives within a TYE community, constantly reinforced by competitive pres-
sures from markets and other communities, whereas SO Es have continuously 
shared the properties of public goods and faced conflicts of interest in many 
aspects. One example is the conflicting roles of SOE managers, who have to be 
simultaneously a government bureaucrat, chief of the SOE community, and 
entrepreneur. (c) Flexibility due to small size, diversified community economy, 
and far from strict bureaucratic control, which give TYEs an advantage to 
capture opportunities emerging in all markets of products, labor, capital, and 
the domestic and international. And (d) simpler principal-agent tier, personnel 
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and employment system, and labor relations, which are induced by the histori-
cal institutional arrangements in rural China and subject to the adjustments 
required by competition. As a consequence, TVEs have out-performed SO Es 
and replaced SOE positions in many areas. The TVE sector has become the 
number one sector in China's industrial production and export. In the near 
future, it will become number one sector in China's GDP generation. 
In contrast, though having enjoyed advantages in technologies, gov-
ernment financing and supporting, SO Es have suffered from many problems 
inherent in SOE institutional arrangements and their ownership and gover-
nance structures. Due to the widely dispersed and ambiguous SOE ownership 
structure and the multiple principal-agent tiers, the SOE sector has suffered 
most serious agency and asymmetric information problems. There are large 
numbers of stakeholders around each SOE, all having sufficient incentive to 
extract value from the SOE but with much less incentive to put their efforts into 
the SOE. This is the essential reason why the SOE financial situation increas-
ingly becomes worse while their output expansion continues - although the 
real performance of the SOE sector is better than what is indicated by official 
statistics ifthe SOEs' broad social contributions are taken into account. How-
ever, much of SOE social contributions may have been transferred into bad 
loans and non-performing debts in the state banking system, when the SOE 
sector has continued to consume about 80 percent of state bank credit funds 
but creates less than 45 percent of China's GDP. 
Due to the broad institutional arrangements and cultural environ-
ments around and within SO Es are so remarkably different from those around 
and within TVEs, there seems to be no partial solution for SO Es to learn from 
TVEs. Facing a hard budget constraint, a survival urge placed by tough market 
and inter-jurisdiction competitions, and the self-initiated adaptive innovations 
induced by the competition and hard budget constraint may be the basic 
lessons TVEs can offer. These basic lessons have been appealing to not only 
SOEs but also TVEs to reform their ownership and governance structures, 
because both SO Es and TVEs have appeared to face similar problems while the 
initially favorable market and environmental conditions enjoyed by TVEs have 
gradually dissolved. Following the expansion of TVE scale and market shares, 
TVE mechanism degeneration has become increasingly serious in those town-
ship and villages where grassroots democratization has lagged behind. It has 
generated serious consequences in TVE performance since the mid- l 990s (Sun 
1999, Section 4.3). The central issues here are, once again, the increased agency 
costs and the question of who monitor the monitors. In this connection, SO Es 
and TVEs face the similar challenge and need to conduct similar reform on their 
ownership and governance structures. Interestingly, collective ownership 
within a small community which faces competition and hard budget constraint 
is more akin to the small commons such as the small fisheries in Maine, where 
a self-initiated effective property-rights arrangement has evolved (Jefferson, 
1998). In fact, many Chinese rural communities initiated "joint stock coopera-
tive" reform even in the 1980s. Such a self-initiated, innovative property rights 
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refonn appeared well-fitting in local conditions in most cases and has become 
widespread in both the SOE and TYE sectors since 1992 (Sun, 1999). 
China's ambitious and radical SOE refonn plan has been delayed by 
the problem of a large number of layoffs and the shock of Asia's financial 
crisis. But the scenario is clear. The plural ownership structures and diversified 
governance structures have emerged and will become widespread in the near 
future, which include pure private ownership, employee stock ownership, joint 
stock partnership or cooperative, leasing, joint ventures, shareholding com-
pany and hybrid fonns of shareholding company, and a small proportion of 
refonned state ownership in certain industries. 
Notes 
I. TYE in this paragraph is interpreted in the broader sense, i.e. including household-run 
and jointly owned private enterprises, which accounted for 33 percent of output and 51 
percent of employment in the broader TYE sector in 1994 and tend to be much smaller 
in scale (Sun, 1997, p. 28). In the discussion which follows, TYEs are understood in the 
narrower sense of those with dominant community ownership only. We may call TYEs 
in the narrower sense "core TYEs" when it is necessary. 
2. Sources: "Selection from the 1995 National Industrial Census", published in People's 
Daily, 19 February 1997; and Ministry of Agriculture, 1997. 
3. The GDP share of SO Es in 1995 is estimated as follows. In 1995, the agricultural 
sector (dominated by peasant households) produced 21 percent of GDP (SSB, 1997, p. 
42), the broader TYE sector contributed 30 percent of GDP (Ministry of Agriculture, 
1997), and the urban collective, private, and foreign sectors could have produced 5 
percent of GDP. 
4. By the end of 1996, there were about 9 million SOE lay-offs in urban China (SSB, 
I 997b, p. 31 ). These workers continued to be identified as SOE employees rather than 
unemployed. Their cash salaries are reduced by a large margin, but other non-pecuniary 
benefits basically remain . In addition, governments at different levels have promised 
and conducted programs to help them find new jobs. Because they have maintained and 
expect to maintain their favorable urban plus SOE social status in the future, they 
usually resist joining TYEs or entering the huge emerging urban labor market that has 
attracted tens of million rural laborers since the late 1980s. 
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